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Abstract 
 
Personal Network Federation (PN-F) aims to 
provide secure interactions between a subset of devices 
of different Personal Networks (PN) for achieving a 
common goal or providing some services in 
collaborative environments.  Security and privacy is 
one of the major concerns in the development and 
acceptance of PN-F like collaborative networks and as 
any other security architecture, the key management is 
the corner stone of any possible solution. In this paper, 
we provide security mechanisms and protocols for key 
exchange and key management in PN Federations and 
specify how the established keys can be used to secure 
communications in different layers.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Personal Network (PN) was introduced and 
studied during the IST-MAGNET project [1]. PN 
consists of a dynamic collection of personal nodes and 
devices around a user (Private PAN or P-PAN), and 
remote personal nodes and devices in different clusters 
(home, office, car … ) that are connected to each other 
through infrastructure or ad hoc networks. Figure 1 
shows general concept of PN architecture. 
 
Figure 1. PN communication architecture [1] 
 
Figure 2. PN-F concept [2] 
The concept of Personal Networks was extended 
into Personal Network Federations (PN-F) in IST- 
MAGNETBeyond project [1]. PN federation (PN-F) 
can be defined as a secure impromptu, situation-aware 
or beforehand agreed cooperation between a subset of 
relevant devices belonging to different PNs for the 
purpose of achieving a common goal or service. Within 
the federation, devices can communicate with each 
other and allow access to specific services or resources 
for performing a common task in collaborative 
working, family networks, virtual classrooms, health 
care networks, etc. Figure 2 illustrates an example of 
PN federation with three PNs. 
Security and privacy is one of the major concerns in 
the development and acceptance of personal network 
technologies. As any other security architecture, the 
PN and PN-F security architecture needs to use well-
established cryptography to authenticate users and 
devices, authorize network usages, protect the integrity 
and confidentiality of the data and provide a good 
network and service availability. In this regard, key 
management, with its own difficulties and limitations, 
is the corner stone of any possible solution.  
In MAGNET phase I, a key agreement protocol 
based on an authenticated Diffie-Hellman (DH) 
protocol as PN Formation Protocol (PFP) was 
developed, which fulfils the security needs of small 
PNs [3]. In MAGNET phase II, we introduced a new 
key agreement protocol called Certified PN Formation 
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Protocol (CPFP) for the larger PNs [4]. CPFP, based 
on the personal public key infrastructure (Personal 
PKI) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), is 
scalable to larger PNs and provides an enhanced level 
of authentication and non-repudiation with ease of key 
revocation and key update. 
In this paper, we discuss and specify the PN-F key 
management solution and cryptographic techniques. 
The PN federation is a challenging concept, involving 
open research issues related to the definition and 
management of the federations, service/user profiles, 
service/device discovery, security, context 
management and networking [5]. Based on how the 
cooperation between the devices in different PNs is 
realized, we can distinguish between two general type 
of infrastructure and ad hoc based federations. While in 
ad hoc based PN federation, our trust establishment is 
based on direct users’ involvement, in infrastructure 
based federations our solutions involve high level of 
trust relationship with a central entity which acts as the 
trusted third party (TTP) for all the PN participants. In 
this regard, in section 2 and 3 respectively, we will 
define our solution for key establishment and 
authentication between PN-F creator and PN-F 
participants in infrastructure and ad hoc based 
federations. In section 4 we discuss the security 
association establishment between the PN-F 
participants and clarify how the authentication and 
access control process will be done. Finally, in section 
5 we conclude the paper with security evaluation of 
purposed protocols.  In description of the protocols, we 
are using the table 1 notations. 
Table 1. Notation 
Symbol Meaning 
E(k, m) Symmetric encryption of data m with key k 
SX(m) Signature of data m using X’s private key 
(assumed that the signature scheme does not 
provide message recovery, e.g. RSA signature by 
hashing input) 
PX(m) Public key encryption of data  m using X’s public 
key 
CertX Certificate binding X’s identity to its public key 
(suitable for both encryption and signature 
verification) 
PKX X’s Public Key 
SKX X’s Private Key 
X X’s Identity 
MAC(k, X) Keyed hash of  X with key k 
HASH(X) Hash function of X 
rX Fresh random number generated by X 
|| Concatenation 
 
Secure channel 
 
Insecure (wireless) channel 
 
Proximity Authenticated Channel (PAC) 
 
Figure 2. High level PNDS view [2] 
 
2.  PN-F key management in infrastructure 
based PN federations 
 
MAGNET Beyond project has studied the PN 
federation architecture in details and has specified a 
central entity named PN directory service (PNDS) in 
infrastructure based PN federations. PNDS embraces a 
business model where users register their PN to a PN 
service provider    and establish their federations via it 
(figure 3). PNDS plays a central role in infrastructure 
based federations with acting as a directory service for 
federations. 
Based on how the PN-F creator or PN-F participants 
publish their federation(s) or announce their 
willingness to participate in federations, there is two 
mode of publish based and invitation based PN 
federation. In publish mode, the creators uses the 
PNDS to advert their PN-F and candidate participants 
use it to look-up for the adverted PN-Fs. In the 
Invitation based, in contrast, the candidate PN-F 
participants announce their willingness of participation 
to PNDS and PN-F creators browse and inquire it to 
find and invite the interested participants to their PN 
federations [2]. 
Our key management solution in infrastructure 
based federations is based on existence of a high level 
trust relationship with the PNCA as the common 
trusted third party (TTP) for all the PN-F participants. 
Without loosing any generality, the proposed solutions 
can be also easily applied to more general case of 
hierarchical certificate authorities (CAs) of a common 
public key infrastructure (PKI). In our solution, all the 
PN-F participants, before participating in any 
federation, authenticate themselves with the PNDS and 
get certificates binding their identities to public keys 
suitable for both encryption and signature verification. 
From the security point of view, both cases of 
publish and invitation mode impose the same 
requirements on trust establishment and key 
management solutions and so we exemplify our 
solution in publish mode.  As  a  result  of  publish  and  
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Figure 4. Infrastructure based PN federation 
 
discovery stage, PN-F candidate participant knows PN-
F creator and can send it a PN-F joining request. PN-F 
candidate participant and PN-F creator authenticate 
each other based on their PNDS certificates and 
establish a secure channel, over which the participant 
sends its PN-F Participation Profile, mainly consisting 
on the resources that it makes available to this 
federation. The Creator then checks whether the 
Candidate fulfils the federation policies and if this is 
the case, the private part of the PN-F Profile, consisting 
on the complete list of PN-F members and a group key 
is securely forwarded to the new PN-F member. The 
secure channel should ensure that no adversary can get 
the group key or replay previously captured messages. 
The shared group key allows a light authentication 
and trust establishment between the PN-F participants, 
but it does not provide an individual member 
authentication by its own. If PN-F application 
mandates the individual member authentication, in 
extra to group key, the PNDS certificate and PN-F 
profile (including the members list), can be used to 
provide mutual authentication. The PN-F creator can 
also optionally issues PN-F certificates for all the PN-F 
participants, which can be used in mutual 
authentication and security association. In this case, the 
PN-F members have a certificate issued by PN-F 
creator as the trusted CA of their common PN-F and 
use it to prove their membership and establish security 
association with other PN-F participants.  
Figure 4 depicts a typical example of authentication 
and security establishment in publish mode of 
infrastructure based PN federation, the details is as 
follow: 
- PN-F creator and participant authenticate with 
PNDS and get certificates on their public keys. It 
can be done through the normal and complicated 
PKI methods or other simple and more usable 
ways (it has been shown by secure channel in 
figure). In the current implementation of PNDS in 
project, PN-F creator and participants authenticate 
the PNDS based on its certificate (which is 
preloaded in their terminals), and the PNDS 
authenticates them through a kind of two factor 
authentication based on their User ID and 
Password. The User ID is set by user and includes 
a mobile phone number which is used to receive 
the generated Password by PNDS in SMS (Short 
Message Service) format [6].  
- Creator uses the PNDS public key to establish a 
symmetric session key with it and publishes its 
PN-F in secure way (encrypted by established 
symmetric key and signed by its private key). In 
publishing the PN-F, creator can limit its visibility 
to authorized participants by specifying the 
credentials that participants should have. 
- Candidate participant uses the PNDS public key to 
establish a symmetric session key with it and 
enquires the PNDS for the available federations. 
The PNDS controls the discoverable federations 
based on the participants’ credentials and replies 
with primary information, including PN-F creator 
names and their point of contacts and certificates, 
for the visible registered federations. All the 
communications are encrypted by established 
symmetric key and signed by the private keys. 
- PN-F creator and participant authenticate each 
others based on their PNDS certificates and 
proceed to establish a secure connection between 
them over the main wireless link. To this end, they 
can use any established public-key-based key 
exchange protocol which requires them to prove 
possession of a particular private key such as 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer 
Security (TLS). As an example, depicted in figure, 
they can establish a pair-wise symmetric key 
through a 3-pass challenge-response protocol as 
follow [7] : 
• Candidate participant sends the PN-F 
creator a signed PN-F joining request, its 
certificate and a fresh random number rB. 
• PN-F creator verifies the authenticity of 
participant’ certificate; extracts its public 
key and verifies its signature on joining 
request. Creator then generates a fresh 
random number rA and a symmetric key 
k1; encrypts k1 with participant’ public 
key and send the result along with rA and 
its signature on rA, rB, participant identity 
and encrypted k1 to the participant. 
• Participant decrypts key k1 and verifies 
creator’ signature. Participant then 
generates symmetric key k2; encrypts k2 
with creator public key and sends the 
result along with its signature on rA, rB, 
creator identity and encrypted k2 to the 
creator.  Participant uses a known key 
PN Directory 
Service (PNDS) 
PKS, SKS 
A, PKA 
PN_F Participant 
(PN_B) 
PKB, SKB 
PS(KAS), E(KAS, PN-F Advert), 
 SA (S, PN_F Advert) PS(KBS), E(KBS, PN-F Lookup),  
SB (S, PN-F Lookup) 
E(KBS, PN-F Reply), SS(B, PN-F Reply) 
CertA CertB 
B, PKB 
PN_F Creator 
(PN_A) 
PKA, SKA 
B, CertB, PN-F join, rB, SB(A, PN-F join) 
rA, PB(A, k1), SA(rA, rB, B, PB(A, k1)) 
PA(B,k2), SB(rB, rA, A, PA(B, k2) 
E(KAB, PN-F Profile) 
E(KAS, Acknowledge) 
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derivation function (KDF) on both key k1 
and k2 to drive the shared symmetric key 
KAB.  
• PN-F creator decrypts key k2, verifies 
participant’ signature and uses the same 
KDF on both key k1 and k2 to drive the 
shared symmetric key KAB. 
- Creator sends the PN-F profile, encrypted by the 
shared symmetric key, to participant. PN-F profile 
includes an updated list of current joined members 
and a group key (PN-F key). 
 
3. PN-F key management in ad hoc based 
federations  
 
In contrary to infrastructure based federations, the 
dynamic nature of ad hoc based federations does not 
guarantee that a trusted third party will always be 
available for the trust establishment and authentication 
between the PN-F members. In the other hand, key pre-
distribution schemes are not also generally applicable, 
since all the participants within the PN-F may not be 
known a priori. Based on these facts, our key 
management solution in ad hoc based federations is 
based on direct users’ involvement and using extra 
proximity authenticated channel (PAC) in 
authenticating the exchanged keys.  
A proximity authenticated channel is a communication 
interface between two devices, which is authenticated 
by physical means of users. We distinguish between 
two types of PAC channels, private and public PAC 
channels, with respect to the level of security the PAC 
channel can provide. A private PAC channel provides 
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality, while a 
public PAC channels provide authenticity and integrity 
only.  
A typical example of a private PAC channel is 
realized by a user, who reads an alphanumeric string 
from the display of one device and then enters it to the 
other device using the keypad.  Clearly such a channel 
sets some limits to the length of the string that can be 
transferred from one device to another, e.g., typically 
32-40 bits, which is feasible to be transferred using 
devices’ user interfaces by the user. Typical 
realizations of public PAC are RFID tags, Infrared 
communication, and public displays on the devices 
(such as an overhead display over a cashier, printer, or 
network access point [8]). If the PAC is public, the 
protocol requires that at least 160 bits of information 
can be transferred over it.    
 
 
Similar to infrastructure based federations, there is 
also two kind of publish and invitation modes in ad hoc 
based federations. While in invitation mode, the PN-F 
creator sends its invitation with the public part of PN-F 
profile to the known participants (known from their 
adverts for participation or known by neighbor 
discovery mechanisms), in publish mode, PN-F 
creators publish their federation(s) by broadcasting 
their adverts including public part of PN-F profile.  
The key management and trust establishment in both 
cases is similar and we concentrate our discussion on 
invitation based federations which is depicted by figure 
5 and includes the following stages: 
- Creator invites the candidate participants by 
sending them signed invitation messages including 
the public part of PN-F profile and its public key. 
- Candidate participants study the received PN-F 
profile, verify the signature and send back   a 
signed Join_Request with their public keys (if they 
are interested in invited federation). 
- PN-F Creator and participant authenticate the 
exchanged public keys over the private or public 
PAC as follow: 
• Private PAC (figure 5.a): Creator 
generates a key K and computes a keyed 
hash on both public keys using the key K, 
and shows the key and MAC result in 
truncated form to its user. Candidate 
participant’s user enters the result in its 
federation manager which uses the key to 
compute the similar keyed hash and 
verifies authenticity of the received 
PN_F Creator 
PN_A 
 (PKA , SKA) 
Invitation, SA (Invitation), PKA 
Join_Request, SB (Join_Request), PKB 
PB(PN-F Profile) 
K, MAC (K, PKA||PKB) K, MAC (K, PKA||PKB) 
OK OK 
PN_F Participant 
PN_B 
 (PKB , SKB) 
PN_F Creator 
PN_A 
 (PKA , SKA) 
Invitation, SA (Invitation), PKA 
Join_Request, SB (Join_Request), PKB 
PB(PN-F Profile) 
HASH (PKA||PKB) 
OK OK 
PN_F Participant 
PN_B 
 (PKB , SKB) 
a) Private PAC 
b) Public PAC 
Figure 5. Ad hoc based PN federation 
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public keys and updates the creator about 
the outcome. 
• Public PAC (figure 5.b): Creator 
generates a hash of both public keys and 
sends it to participant over the public 
PAC. The participant calculates the 
similar hash, compares the result and 
updates the creator about the outcome.    
- After authentication, creator sends an encrypted 
copy of the PN-F profile to each participant which 
includes the PN-F key or PN-F certificate issued 
by creator. PN-F participants use the PN-F key as 
the group key or the PN-F certificates for 
authentication and secure communication in PN-F. 
 
4. Security association between the PN-F 
members 
 
The security association between the PN-F 
members can be established using shared PN-F key, 
PN-F certificates and PNDS certificate plus creator-
signed PN-F member list. In the first case, all the PN-F 
members share PN-F key as the group key and use it to 
prove their PN-F membership. In the second case, all 
PN-F members have a PN-F certificate on their public 
key,  issued by creator as the PN-F common root 
certificate authority (CA) and use their private keys to 
prove they are owners of such that certificates. In the 
last one, PN-F participants use their PNDS certificate 
and creator-signed member list (part of PN-F profile) 
as a proof for their PN-F membership.  In this section 
we investigate these mechanisms in establishing 
security association between the PN-F members and 
discuss pros and cons of each method. 
 
4.1. PN-F key based security association 
 
In this method, PN-F creator sends all the PN-F 
participants a shared PN-F key as a part of PN_F 
profile which will be used in authentication and 
security association establishment between the PN-F 
participants. PN-F participants authenticate each others 
by showing their knowledge of shared PN-F key and 
use the PN-F key for secure communication within the 
PN-F. Figure 6 shows a typical challenge-response 
protocol that can be used in PN-F participants’ 
authentication as follow: 
- Participant B generates a random number rB and 
send it to participant A. 
- Participant A generates a random number rA and 
sends back a shared PN-F key encrypted version 
of both random number and participant B identity 
to participant B. 
 
Figure 6. PN-F key based security association 
 
- Participant B decrypts the packet, verifies its 
random number and sends back s a shared PN-F 
key encrypted version of both random number to 
participant A. 
- Participant A decrypts the packet and verifies its 
random number. 
The shared group key does not need any 
asymmetric cryptography or storage for different key 
or certificates and allows a light authentication and 
trust establishment between the PN-F participants, but 
it does not provide an individual member 
authentication. 
  When there is a need to expel a participant, a new 
group key should be used; in this case, the creator shall 
update the group key of all remaining members and 
remove the revoked PN from the member list in the 
PN-F database. 
 
4.2. PN-F certificate based security association  
 
In this solution, PN-F creator acts as a certificate 
authority (CA) for its PN-F and issues PN-F certificate 
for all its participants. It means that every PN-F 
member get a PN-F certificate on their authenticated 
public key (authenticated via proximity authenticated 
channels in ad hoc based federation or via PNCA 
certificate in infrastructure based federation) which is 
valid for that PN-F and include PN-F’ ID, member’s 
identity, issue date, validity and also shows whether 
the member can invite new member to that federation 
or no (creator’s right delegation).  
The PN-F certificates are used by PN-F participants 
as proof of membership in PN-F by proving that 
certificates stem from the same root and participants 
poses the respective pair keys. PN-F members also use 
the certificate in authentication and security association 
with each other by using any established public-key-
based key exchange protocol such as Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS). 
PN-F certificate allows individual authentication in 
price of higher processing. It shall be also possible to 
PN_B 
(PN_F Participant) 
PN_A 
(PN_F Partcipant) 
rB 
EPN-F Key (rA, rB, B) 
EPN-F Key (rB, rA) 
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revoke a PN from the federation. In case of PN-F 
certificates, a certification revocation list (CRL) will be 
used, which will contain all revoked certificates that 
are still within their validity period. Members will 
make sure that they are aware of the revoked 
certificates. The PN-F profile shall define how this 
CRL will be made known to the members. An obvious 
option is to retrieve the CRL at the federation manager 
of the PN-F creator.  
 
4.3. PNDS Certificate based security 
association 
 
In infrastructure based federations, when each 
member has a PNCA certificate, PNCA certificates and 
creator-signed PN-F member list which is part of PN-F 
profile can be used to prove PN-F membership. In this 
case, PN-F participants’ mutual authentication and 
security association establishment is based on PNCA 
certificate and will be done through the standard 
public-key-based key exchange protocol such as SSL 
or TLS.  
 
5. Security evaluation of protocols  
 
Our PN-F key management solution in 
infrastructure based federation uses the established 
cryptographic algorithms which according to the 
current state of knowledge are secured. In ad hoc based 
federations, our protocols based on using the PAC in 
authenticating the exchanged public keys, are such 
designed to be usable (e.g. just entering 4 digits which 
is easy even for non-technical people) and secure 
against any man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. 
 In private PAC scenario, as the key K is chosen 
randomly each time and the private PAC provides 
confidentiality, an attacker gets no knowledge on the 
key K or on the MAC from the protocol runs. Hence, 
the only possible attacks are to block the messages 
over the Private PAC to prevent that the imprinting 
stage from finishing or to replace PN device’ key with 
its own key for impersonation and to hope that the 
MAC value remains valid by coincidence. Assuming a 
message size of 8 digits, the probability of success in 
that case is less than 2-16 which is an accepted target for 
our protocol.  
In public PAC scenario, as the public PAC provides 
integrity and authenticity, an attacker can either again 
block the messages to prevent the completion of the 
imprinting stage or replace either of public keys with 
another key to achieve impersonation. The replacement 
remains only undetected if the hash value would be the 
same. However, as our hash function is collision 
resistant and its output is at least 160 bits, this is 
possible only with a negligible probability. 
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